MAKING AND PRESERVING STATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

What Can We Learn from Tilly?

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Charles Tilly has famously argued that "war makes states," and he has described the emergence and increasing dominance of a particular kind of state – the "national" or "consolidated" state -- in Europe from 990 to 1990 (1985, 170).[1] In this paper, I consider whether Tilly's argument can be applied to understand what it will take to make and preserve states in the 21st century.

I argue that, although Tilly argues that international, military, and economic conditions were vital to the emergence and dominance of European states from 990 to 1990, his treatment of these variables is too contingent and *ad hoc* to yield testable hypotheses about state birth and survival. Moreover, his ruminations about the future of the state suggest that Tilly himself does not expect his conclusions to travel. To move from description to prediction, it is necessary to develop a systematic understanding of contextual conditions such as international anarchy, polarity, and prevailing military and economic technologies. At the end of the paper, I summarize the approach I have taken to this problem, as well as my preliminary findings, which suggest that these conditions continue to influence state formation and survival.

Tilly's Argument

Tilly's argument is clear: "extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organizational structures of states" (1990, 15). In general,

> … a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in a substantial territory, but that war making led to increased extraction of the means of war … from the population within that territory. …The very activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord's local rivals; thus it led to state making (1985, 183).

But the specific circumstances of individual states had important implications for state structure:

> [W]hen men began to concentrate coercion in various parts of Europe the relative presence or absence of concentrated capital predicted (and to some degree caused) different trajectories of change in state structure (1990, 133).

Specifically, three types of state emerged: coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized coercion. These variations in structure affect state vulnerability to death.

Coercion-intensive states, which arose in "landlord-dominated regions" where capital was scarce, were "bulky, centralized states" vulnerable to "immobility or collapse," as well as revolutions of "landlords, their private armies and the peasants" (1990, 225; 1993: 31, 102, 231).

Capital-intensive states arose around concentrations of capital such as port cities and were sleek and efficient. But their fragmentation and reliance on capital made them vulnerable to revolution by the

[1] According to Tilly, national states are "relatively autonomous, centralized, and differentiated organizations exerting close control over the population within several sharply-bounded contiguous regions." Empires, by contrast, are administered locally, while city-states and urban federations are fragmented (1990: 2, 21, 164). "During the last five hundred years… almost all of Europe has formed into national states with well-defined boundaries and mutual relations [and] the European system has spread to virtually the entire world" (1990, 181; 1993, 35).

bourgeoisie and urban artisans. After "the growth of huge citizen armies" in the 18th and 19th centuries, they were vulnerable to conquest as well (1990: 152, 224-225; 1993, 102).

By contrast, states reliant on capitalized coercion, which "formed chiefly at the edges of the urban column, where cities and their capital were accessible but not overwhelming," were able to deal with both internal and external challenges (1990, 133; 1993, 31). Because the state was not the only center of capital, it had to consider citizen demands. But because the state had autonomous coercive power, it rarely faced revolutionary situations (1993, 141), so it could respond to demands in ways that enhanced its international status. In England, for example,

> The uneasy alliance between landlords and merchants constrained royal autonomy, but fortified state power. Commercialized agriculture, far-ranging trade, imperial conquest, and war against rival European powers complemented each other, promoting an investment in naval power and a readiness to mobilize land forces for action overseas. The commercialization of both urban and rural economies meant that taxation and borrowing for war went more easily, and with less state apparatus, than in many other European countries (1990, 159).

Over time, states following the capitalized-coercion model (which Tilly also calls "large national states") "became dominant in Europe, and other states converged on their characteristics" (1990: 133, 136). This was partly a result of the initial advantages of these states, with their advantageous placement in territories with both economic and military resources. It was also a result of historical contingency:

> Because each interaction [between state and society] produced new organizational residues and social relations, the path followed by a state up to a certain point in time limited the strategies open to its rulers beyond that point. …[T]heir previous histories haunted them (1990: 137, 160; 1985, 183).

But the dominance of states reliant on capitalized coercion (CC) also reflected changing conditions in the world, to which these states were best suited to adapt, due to their previous success and optimal structure:

> [T]hose states drew on their new wealth to build military power, and used their military to seek out new wealth. …At each stage, they had the means of acquiring and deploying the most effective military technology on a much larger scale than their neighbors. Since war pays off on effectiveness rather than efficiency, they gave smaller neighbors hard choices: mount the same sort of military effort at great cost, accept conquest, or find a safe subordinate niche" (1990, 189-190).

This evolutionary element in Tilly's thought is reminiscent of Machiavelli, who argues that "a republic has a fuller life and enjoys good fortune for a longer time than a principality, since it is better able to adapt itself to diverse circumstances owing to the diversity found among its citizens" (1970, III.9, 431). Unfortunately, like Machiavelli, Tilly's treatment of these circumstances is contingent and *ad hoc*.[2] He explains neither why they arise nor how they work together to affect outcomes, except in the period under consideration. As a result, it is impossible to know whether these conditions persist today and, if so, how they are likely to affect contemporary states and would-be states.

[2] On Machiavelli, see Adams (2000, 46-57).

Tilly's Contextual Causal Claims

Tilly cites four contextual conditions as contributing to the rise of large national states in Europe: international cooperation, military conditions, economic conditions, and the relationship between military and economic conditions. But Tilly's superficial treatment of these factors makes it impossible to know when they are likely to be important, and how they are likely to operate

International Cooperation

According to Tilly, beginning in the 16th century, the growing connectedness and dominance of European states gave them "a growing influence over the organization and territory of new states," both in Europe (where states defined nationalism to their benefit and to the detriment of would-be states) and abroad (through the transfer of territory and recognition of states in post-war peace agreements). That is, the strength of CC states ensured their ability to determine the conditions of the peace and, thus, to perpetuate themselves (1990, 167-183; 1993: 47, 246-247).

Although international involvement in state formation and perpetuation is obvious over this period, one wonders what caused it and what could derail it. Tilly does not explore this much; he simply suggests that state success in one era led to success in another, and that, as successful states increasingly bumped into one another, they cooperated to determine system membership.

Because Tilly does not consider factors, other than geography, that caused different initial concentrations of capital and coercion and that caused the combination of capital and coercion to be most adaptable over time, he does not fully answer the question of why European states were so successful. He is also unable to predict whether their success will last. If the background conditions affecting the salience of geography and the spatial distribution of military and economic capabilities changed and/or if non-European states pursued grand strategies and industrial policies capable of creating competitive advantage, European states could weaken, and their influence over the creation of new states could dissipate. Moreover, states that have been created and sustained through international cooperation could unravel.

To predict which states would be most vulnerable to this fate, it would be helpful to know why European great powers elevated some would-be states to statehood while they ignored others and helped certain states survive while they allowed others to fail. Are these causes timeless or variable? For example, is great power intervention a ubiquitous but unpredictable aspect of international anarchy, or is it strongly correlated with international polarity and military technology (Waltz 1979; Adams 2003/04; Adams 2005)? Under what conditions does international intervention best assure state survival? Without exploring these issues, it is impossible to predict which of today's aspiring states are likely to benefit from the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, and whether (and under what conditions) states created in the wake of those wars are likely to survive.

Military Conditions

According to Tilly, "European states started in very different positions as a function of the distribution of concentrated capital and coercion. They changed as the intersections of capital and coercion altered. But military competition eventually drove them all in the same general direction" (1990, 191).

Two military developments were especially important. First, after the French *levée en masse* of 1793, the replacement of mercenary forces with "mass standing armies drawn from the civilian population … inflate[ed] … war and its costs." This favored CC states because they had the military

capability to coerce conscription and extraction (military forces to patrol national borders, police forces to round up draft dodgers and tax cheats) and the political authority and economic resources to induce compliance (direct rule, expanded definitions of citizenship, participatory institutions, entitlements, etc) (1990, 183; 1993: 29, 30, 32, 100).

Second, beginning in the 16th century, Tilly notes a trend away from international war to civil war, which he attributes to "consolidation of the state system, segregation of military from civilian life, and disarmament of the civilian population… War became more intense and destructive, more continuous once it began, but a much rarer event." When war did occur, equality of power (especially of commercial and industrial power needed for total war) and external intervention in nationalist rebellions were generally to blame. After 1945, the "standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States almost eliminated war among European states within Europe, but made the points of contact among Soviet, American, and Chinese power outside of Europe critical locations for the pursuit of national interest" (1990: 180, 185-186).

Because Tilly is both unusual and well known for his argument that "war makes states," his emphasis on the importance of military conditions in European state formation and dominance is not surprising (Lynn, 1991; Karza 1996). What is surprising is that Tilly's treatment of the causes and implications of these developments is quite superficial, in three ways.

First, Tilly "does not specify which aspects of war have had which effects on the state's extractive policies or institutional development" (Karza 1996, 366). If mobilization is supreme, war could "make states" even if fighting never occurred. But if war only contributes to state formation and survival in certain strategic or operational circumstances, whether war will continue to have this effect will depend on the likelihood of attack and the ease of conquest, which are affected by the offense-defense-deterrence balance of prevailing military technologies (Adams 2003/04).

Second, Tilly does not consider why the military conditions he mentions arose and whether they will persist. If large, national armies became anachronisms, large national states would have to adapt, and new kinds of states could emerge.

Finally, Tilly does not systematically explore the prospects for civil vs. international war in the contemporary international system. If the trend away from international to civil war depended on bipolarity (which led to the wholesale transfer of military and police forces to post-colonial states after World War II and superpower competition for influence in the Third World), civil war should decline in the post-Cold War, unipolar system, and international war and state death by conquest should increase. But if it depended on international resolve to maintain the territorial status quo, international war and conquest should be less likely than civil wars and state death by revolution, disintegration, and collapse -- regardless of international polarity. Nuclear danger should have similar effects (Adams 2000, Adams 2003/04). Tilly alludes to all of these possibilities (1990: 197-203, 207, 220-225). But, apart from emphasizing the importance of external intervention to the militarization of contemporary Third World states, he does not attempt to sort out the implications of these findings for the future. In the unipolar international system, are existing states more or less likely to be shielded from external intervention? Are new states more or less likely to be equipped with strong militaries? Would states with more culturally-appropriate boundaries fight more international wars than their arbitrarily-drawn counterparts, irrespective of the "territorial covenant" and/or nuclear deterrence (Jackson and Zacher, 1996)?

Economic Conditions

Economic conditions cited by Tilly as contributing to the rise of national states in Europe include the "urbanization that accelerated after 1800, a shift from mercantile to industrial capitalism, quickening

proletarianization of both rural and urban labour, vast population growth, mass emigration" (1993, 37). According to Tilly, the development of capitalism was especially important:

> As economies and polities nationalized, all of Europe shifted to some extent from local toward national claims, … direct claims on regional and national power-holders, … claims made in the names of whole categories of the population (1993, 37-38).

Over time, this transformation made the coercive dimension of CC states (and more generally the military origins and foundations of state power) less and less relevant. The age-old causes of war remained: "War makers and state makers [are] coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs;" they are "racketeers" who produce "both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it" (1985: 169, 171). But the development of national economies "civilianized" government and diminished the role of the military:

> At each step from patrimonialism to brokerage, from brokerage to nationalization, and from nationalization to specialization, … new and significant barriers arose to limit the autonomous power of military men (1990, 124).

Here again, Tilly's argument about why CC states were most able to adapt is clear. Unlike coercion-intensive states, they could emphasize economic growth and distribution without fear of military coups. Unlike capital-intensive states, they could coerce compliance with new political and economic arrangements. But what was behind the spread of capitalism, and does it still provide disproportionate benefits to large, civilianized states? Is this a permanent feature of capitalism, or could it change with polarity and military technology? Does civilianization represent a fundamental departure from coercion, or does it just "mitigat[e] and obscure[e]" it (Tilly 1990, 51)?

<u>The Relationship between Military and Economic Conditions</u>

The final contextual condition to which Tilly alludes is the relationship between military and economic conditions. He does so in three ways.

First, Tilly's central argument in *Coercion, Capital and the European States* is that the dominance of large, national states such as England and France can be attributed to their location in regions where both coercion and capital were concentrated (1990, 187-188; 1993, 30-32).

Second, Tilly mentions changing "intersections of capital and coercion" as conditions to which these European states had to adapt (1990, 191).

Finally, Tilly argues that "[u]nder most circumstances, the spatial distribution of state activity that serves military purposes well differs sharply from the spatial distribution that serves the production of revenues." This discrepancy "encourages the creation of separate organizations for each activity … [and] any such geographic division separates the military from political power and makes it dependent for survival on civilians" (1990, 125-126).

Each of these elements of Tilly's argument raises questions. What gave meaning to the initial concentrations of capital and coercion? That is, does geography have unchanging and inherent meaning, or is its importance affected by deeper factors such as the international distribution of power and the nature of military and economic technologies, all of which can change?

Moreover, what made capitalized coercion so powerful? Was it simply that international anarchy means that states with both economic and military capabilities are most likely to survive and prosper (Waltz 1979, 131)? Or was the strength of that combination a result of more specific (and variable) factors such as the extent to which military and economic technologies and production processes

intertwined? If the latter, do economic and military technologies still reinforce one another in the high-tech, nuclear world? Without exploring these questions, it is impossible to know whether contemporary non-European states should cultivate their own military and economic resources or look outside for sustenance. Moreover, it is hard to say whether contemporary states can achieve economic growth and civilianization through military investment or whether they should take a purely economic approach.

Tilly's Ruminations about the Future

Although *Coercion, Capital and the European States, AD 990-1990* covers a millennium and has thus been characterized (both by Tilly and others) as making "huge comparisons" to illuminate "large processes" (Tilly 1984; Paige 1999), Tilly's argument about the relationship between war and state formation and preservation is primarily retrospective and *ad hoc*. This is not a problem from Tilly's point of view. As a practitioner of historical institutionalism, he accepts the role of accident and contingency in the evolution of states. Moreover, the questions he sets out to answer are primarily backward-looking (1990: 32, 187-191; 1993, 7-8).

But what are the implications of Tilly's findings for contemporary states? Will war continue to drive "not only the state system and the formation of individual states, but also the distribution of power over the state?" (1990, 187).

In the few forward-looking passages in *Coercion, Capital and the European States*, Tilly concentrates on his concerns about the militarization of Third-World states (1985, 186; 1990, ch. 7, esp. 225). Yet in these passages, Tilly provides two indications that he does not believe his argument about European state making can be used to predict which states will survive and prosper in the future.

First, Tilly argues that although war making used to be required for state formation and survival, contemporary states (including Third World states and states with "substantial world power" such as Japan) can pursue different strategies because they can borrow or buy war-making capabilities from others (1985, 184; 1990, 225). Interestingly, although this emphasis on military power suggests some continuity in the requisites of state emergence and survival, Tilly emphasizes the discontinuity, suggesting that such states are more secure than their European antecedents because their status is dependent on external, not internal forces (1990, 181). But, as noted above, without systematic exploration of the factors that lead to international recognition and assistance, it is unclear whether this will continue to be the case.

Second, Tilly suggests that war itself can be overcome:

> Destroy the state, and create Lebanon. Fortify it, and create Korea. Until other forms displace the national state, neither alternative will do. The only real answer is to turn the immense power of national states away from war and toward the creation of justice, personal security, and democracy (Tilly 1990, 225).

Thus, unlike classical realists such as Morgenthau (1978) who see human nature as the source of war, Tilly locates its source in the nature of particular men ("military men"), whom society can constrain. If such men were permanently restrained (or re-educated), the requisites of state preservation could change. Coercion-intensive states could fail in great numbers as the territorial covenant became unnecessary to maintain peace. Indeed, the pendulum could swing all the way back to capital-intensive states, or even statelessness. In *Coercion, Capital, and the European States*, Tilly suggests this process is already underway in Europe, where state spending on social services is rising, and military personnel and military spending are falling – trends he attributes to the development of capitalism and the creation of national

economies (1990, 120-124). But in *European Revolutions 1492-1992*, Tilly suggests that capitalism has reached a new, international phase in which even large, national states will lose coercive control over their borders: "Western states in general are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain control of migrant workers, capital, drugs, technologies and money. All of them are internationalizing and becoming exceedingly mobile" (1993, 247). Tilly does explain why internationalization has occurred or whether and how it will affect civilianization. His assumption, shared by many in the early 1990s, seems to be that the spread of capitalism is benign, welcomed, and irreversible. But if the sources of civilianization are compacts between states and citizens, on the one hand, and organizational separation of coercion and capital, on the other, internationalization, which would imperil both of these, could herald a return to military conflict and the emergence of new state forms. Moreover, if globalization has been facilitated by unipolarity, it could be reversed by the rise of new great powers.

If war made European states but no longer sustains them, what are the requisites of state survival in the 21st century? Moreover, if war made European states but did not make contemporary non-European ones (except insofar as their existence was ratified in postwar treaties), if international war rarely occurs, and if as a result of international assistance contemporary non-European states are more secure than their historical European counterparts, will state birth and death cease to occur? Tilly suggests as much when he underscores the ability of contemporary states to raise the barriers to entry. But, at the same time, he alludes to the disappearance of European states and the reemergence of cultural pluralism (1993, 246-248).

From the small number of pages devoted to these ruminations, it is clear that Tilly is not interested in exploring these possibilities more deeply. But even if he was, without taking a number steps back up the ladder of abstraction, it would be impossible to apply Tilly's argument about the creation and perpetuation of historical European states to illuminate likely trends in state formation and preservation in the future.

What It Will Take to Assess the Future of the State

Will most contemporary states survive? Will civilianization proceed to the point that war and perhaps the state itself disappear? To answer these and other questions about the future of the state, it is necessary to consider the international and technological contexts within which states operate. That is my purpose in a book manuscript currently underway (a revision of Adams 2000). In the remainder of this paper, I provide an overview of the issues I have had to confront in framing this project.

What is a State?

To determine what historical trends in state survival and death have been, and to illuminate their future, it is necessary to define "state" at a higher level of abstraction and with regard to more empirical criteria than scholars have usually done. In this respect, Tilly's (and Weber's) insight that states are simply "racketeers" that, through "massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion" have achieved the ability to wield "legitimate" violence within a particular territory, is valuable (Tilly 1985, 172-175; Tilly 1993, 33; Weber 1958, 78).

Tilly's case study method makes it easy to focus on actors with empirical sovereignty (although in his discussion of empires the distinction is temporarily lost).[3] But in his discussion of trends in the 20th century international system, Tilly makes a perilous assumption: that international recognition

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[3] Paraphrasing Doyle, Tilly claims that "in an empire, one state exercises sovereignty over at least one other distinct state" (1990, 167) – which would seem to be ruled out by Tilly's definition of "states" in terms of monopolization of force.

(specifically membership in the League of Nations and United Nations) and empirical sovereignty generally coincide (1990, 199). In fact, in Europe and the Middle East from 1816 to 1994, entities that lacked empirical sovereignty were often recognized by great powers and often belonged to international organizations, while states with demonstrable, empirical sovereignty went years without juridical recognition (Adams 2003).

To explore historical trends in state survival and death and make predictions about the future, it is necessary to develop data on all of the empirically-sovereign states that existed in a particular region, or world-wide, over some period of time. Although scholars frequently assume that the Correlates of War Project encompasses all (and only) such states, in fact it does not. From 1816 to 1994, the Correlates of War (COW) system membership data includes 15 European and Middle Eastern non-state entities comprising a total of 91 entity years and lacks data for 99 empirically-sovereign European and Middle Eastern states comprising 3,153 state years -- 37% of the state years I have identified. Systematically excluded from the data are small, young, dead, 19th century, and non-European states (Adams 2003).

Given these problems with data on international system membership, I have developed my own data set, the State Survival and Death (SSAD) Data, which includes all of the states that survived and died by all means -- conquest, union, revolution, disintegration, and collapse -- in Europe and the Middle East from 1816 to 1994.[4] I am currently updating this data to 2005.

What Are Reasonable Hypotheses about Trends in State Survival and Death?

Like Tilly, I expect international conditions as well as military and economic factors to strongly affect the life chances of states. Unlike Tilly, I am willing to go out on a limb and specify these expectations in testable hypotheses with clear causal claims, instead of couching them in terms of historical contingencies and conjunctures. Although this will no doubt make me the target of even more back-handed criticism than Tilly has received for his sweeping, yet contingent, historical studies,[5] it is the only way to gain any leverage on the question of what it will take for states to survive and prosper in the coming decades, a question well worth answering, in my view, given the negative implications of state death for individual, social, and international security (Adams 2000, ch.1).

My hypotheses concern both the causes and consequences of state survival and death. Moreover, because I want to answer the fundamental national security question of what it takes for states to survive, I consider all possible means of death -- conquest, union, revolution, disintegration, and collapse. In particular, I ask, when are states most and least vulnerable to death? Are they vulnerable to death by different means in different eras? Do states that die have different military, economic, or political capabilities or attributes than those that survive? Which contemporary states are most vulnerable to death, what can they do to survive, and how can other states help them? Finally, what effects does international assistance have on international conflict and cooperation, and on the rise and fall of great powers?

To answer these questions, I elaborate hypotheses about the domestic, international, and technological causes of state vulnerability to death, as well as about the individual and international

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[4]For descriptions of the data, see Adams (2000, 2003, and 2003/04). See also the codebook for Adams (2003/04), available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=article&item_id=710

[5] Lynn, for example, writes that Tilly, "like some motorcycle dare-devil, …pleases his fans not so much by clearing all the obstacles as by simply demonstrating the nerve to make the leap" (1991, 86).

consequences of state death. These hypotheses are based on the existing literature on state death,[6] prominent theories of international politics (especially Waltz's structural-realist theory),[7] and arguments about the offense-defense-deterrence balance of military technology, Fordist and post-Fordist industrial production technologies, and the relationship between military and economic technologies.[8]

I argue that the international and technological contexts within which states operate are important sources of state vulnerability to death. Specifically, the absence of an international sovereign capable of and willing to maintain international order and extend assistance to vulnerable states makes states vulnerable to death at any time and by any means. But the technological environment within which states operate makes them more vulnerable to death in some eras than in others. Specifically, states are most vulnerable to conquest and union when prevailing military technologies are offense-dominant and industrial technologies entail considerable economies of scale. States are most vulnerable to revolution, disintegration, and collapse when mass production technologies dominate and military spending has few economic spin-offs. The technological environment is not determinative, however. Prevailing military and economic technologies make states more vulnerable to death at some times than at others, but whether specific states survive or die depends on whether they develop military, economic, and political capabilities consonant with the technological environment of the day. State vulnerability to death also depends on the availability of international assistance, which is strongly affected by international polarity and great power decline.

In terms of consequences, I argue that the international-political system is profoundly affected by state death. International anarchy makes states worry about the possibility that other states will accumulate power through conquest or union, or that they will spread their influence by encouraging revolution. In fact, this is the fundamental reason balances of power recurrently form. Yet because states are less vulnerable to conquest in deterrence-dominant eras than they are in defense- and offense-dominant ones, today they may be less inclined to balance the power of expanding states than they would be in other technological environments. But the impetus to balance also depends on prevailing economic technologies.

To test these arguments, as well as the alternative arguments I elaborate, I use qualitative case studies and the quantitative methodology of event history analysis of state survival and death among all states in the SSAD data.

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[6]This literature focuses on the effects of bad leadership, weak socio-economic and political structures, culture, and unworkable size. Among the scholars whose work I consider are Aristotle, Machiavelli, Karl Marx, Arnold Toynbee, Theda Skocpol, Joel S. Migdal, I. William Zartman, Peter Evans, Francis Fukuyama, Graham Fuller, and Leopold Kohr.

[7]The international relations theories and arguments upon which I focus are structural-realist theory as developed by Kenneth N. Waltz; liberal and constructivist arguments about international norms advanced by Robert H. Jackson, J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, and Alexander Wendt; and Tanisha Fazal's argument about the vulnerability of buffer states.

[8]In developing arguments about the effects of the technological environment on state vulnerability to death, I draw on structural-realist theory; macro-political and historical arguments about the effects of technology on international politics (especially those of Barry Buzan); arguments about the offense-defense balance articulated by George Quester, Robert Jervis, and Steven Van Evera; theories of military revolution developed by Bernard Brodie and Andrew F. Krepinevich; theories of Fordist and post-Fordist production developed by Robert W. Cox, Charles F. Sable, and Michael J. Piore; and Herbert Kitschelt's theory of industrial governance structures.

To date, my findings conform to my expectations. Individually and together, prevailing military and economic technologies make contemporary states far more vulnerable to revolution, disintegration, and collapse than to conquest and union (Adams 2000). Thus policy makers should be more concerned with internal security than they have historically been. Yet unipolarity has heightened state vulnerability to conquest among non-nuclear states. Thus, until bipolarity or multipolarity emerges, non-nuclear states on the outs with the United States are likely either to obtain nuclear weapons or ally (perhaps even unite) with states that have them (Adams 2003/04).

Conclusion

Charles Tilly has described in rich detail the history of state formation and preservation in Europe. But what will make and preserve states in the 21st century? Answering this question demands more causal clarity and abstraction than Tilly has offered. Yet, like Tilly's explanation for the rise and dominance of large national states in Europe, my answer calls attention to international, military, and economic contexts. Moreover, it too suggests that, although military and economic conditions are fundamental sources of state security and vulnerability, international intervention can both mitigate and exacerbate those conditions.

Because international politics continue to occur in an anarchic realm in which war cannot be ruled out and in which war and preparations for war preoccupy both the dominant state and many lesser powers, Tilly's adage that "war makes states" continues to ring true. So does the expectation that states will continue to exist in some form. But the changing nature of economic capabilities means that coercion-intensive states (such as militarized Third World states) are unlikely to find survival as easy in the 21st century as they did after 1945, especially if they run afoul of the unipolar power. Until multipolarity emerges, the underlying vulnerability of these coercion-intensive states to death by both internal and external means will be exacerbated by declining assistance from middle powers, whose survival depends less and less (due to nuclear weapons) on military forces and alliances, and more and more (due to military-economic decoupling) on economic investment and competitiveness.

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